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An engagement with "the law" in India provides a very mixed picture. 
In terms of size, population and religious, cultural and linguistic diver-
sity India resembles a continent much more than a single state. 
Indeed, scholars have questioned whether conventional categories 
such as the nation state are applicable, need to be adapted or need to 
be redrafted altogether (Stepan, Linz & Yadav 2011). Hence, this 
diversity has conceptual and practical bearings on any inquiry into 
India’s legal landscape.  
On the one hand, international indices and rankings regarding the 
rule of law, media portrayals and public protests in India present a 
bleak picture of the Indian legal system: Particularly, access to justice, 
the malfunctioning of the judicial apparatus, long court procedures as 
well as a lack of knowledge about individual rights have been subject 
to criticism. Honour killings, female feticide or child marriages happen 
under the eyes of a state, which seems incapable of curbing them. The 
reports about the aggravated rape of a student on a bus in Delhi in 
December 2012, the following protests and the discussion about the 
reform of the Indian penal law featured prominently in international 
media and provoked domestic and international debates about the law 
in India. 
 On the other hand, scholarship, especially in comparative law, has 
pointed out the positive aspects of the Indian legal system. For over 
half a century, India has been a rather stable democracy. India’s con-
stitution—arguably the longest in the world—not only provides for civil 
and political rights, but also lists social and economic rights. India's 
Supreme Court, known for its activism, has strengthened the rights of 






























been hailed by some scholars as "the most powerful court in the world" 
(Jaising 2011: 257; Sathe 2002: 249). Many areas of law are gover-
ned by a detailed set of rules and regulations. 
So is the problem merely that the laws in place are not implemen-
ted? Indeed, there is a wide gap between the law in the books and the 
law as practised on the ground (Menski 2000: 143). Does this mean 
that India simply needs to work on its law enforcement to close this 
gap? It is obviously not that easy. We believe that an engagement with 
the law in India has to take the complexities and ambiguities of the 
context into account; it cannot stop at a simple juxtaposition of the law 
on paper and the malfunctioning practices on the ground. Such a black 
and white picture draws on (Western) understandings of law and uses 
models and benchmarks to assess the "proper" functioning of the legal 
system, which functions differently in the Indian context. It also draws 
on binaries that might not suffice to describe the full picture: The west 
vs. "the rest", modernity vs. tradition, universalism vs. cultural relati-
vism. In fact, state law cannot remain the only research focus. 
This FOCUS provides a differentiated analysis of diverse legal con-
texts in India. The authors move away from a narrow understanding of 
law as including only written norms enacted by a state authority. The 
FOCUS thus aims to contribute to a growing body of literature that 
centres on showcasing diversity, through different approaches: legal 
pluralism, interdisciplinarity and law in context. To us, these approa-
ches function like a kaleidoscope. Looking through a kaleidoscope 
makes everything that seemed simple and clearly defined suddenly 
appear more complex. Forms, shapes and colours lose their rigid con-
tours, they blur and overlap and thereby create something new. In a 
similar vein, gazing at law in India through the kaleidoscope shows 
that different spheres of law coexist, clash, overlap and intertwine, and 
through their entanglement might create something new.  
Why are these approaches fruitful for the Indian context? Legal plu-
ralism refers to the presence of multiple legal orders within one social 
field (Griffith 1986), such as state law, customary law based on culture 
or religion or other value systems. Werner Menski has illustrated the 
interplay of different law or value systems with a kite model. According 
to this model, law "needs to be navigated between four competing cor-
ners, namely natural law and positivism and socio-legal norms and 
international norms. Law, being internally plural, is then its own 'other' 
all the time, causing constant conflicts and tensions" (Menski 2011: 






























account: "Legal navigation strategies require constant rethinking to 
produce appropriate and sustainable solutions. One wrong movement, 
and the kite might crash" (ibid.: 19). So, what could those tensions 
and conflicts between the four corners of the kite be? Surely, non-state 
legal systems—whether based on culture or religion—might clash with 
international human rights standards or with constitutional provisions, 
such as the right to equality. But scholarship must go further than 
merely pointing to the conflicts and also take into account how 
different spheres of law overlap and intertwine and how people navi-
gate between the spheres, how they define law according to a specific 
context or how they chose state or non-state forums to settle their dis-
putes.  
Legal pluralism is certainly not a particularly Indian phenomenon, 
but it plays out in India in a particular way because of the country’s 
high degree of heterogeneity. The Indian constitution reflects this 
heterogeneity by emphasising respect for cultural and religious diver-
sity as well as for regional identities. Furthermore, we witness in India 
a phenomenon of "cumulative domination" wherein caste, class, gen-
der, religion, age and rural–urban variations conjointly render a small 
part of the population absolutely dominant and large parts of the 
population utterly dominated (Oommen 2004: 520). How can the law 
accommodate these diversities and ambiguities? Certainly a one-law-
fits-all approach does not work. Instead, the Indian state seems to 
uphold a model that tolerates different sets of non-state law, rather 
than prohibiting and replacing them with state law. This can lead to 
interesting amalgams of value systems, rules and laws and interplays 
of tradition and modernities. The contributions in this FOCUS illustrate 
these constellations, while at the same time the authors are cautious 
not to explain the different legal systems in terms of simple binaries 
such as tradition vs. modernity or the universality of (human) rights 
vs. cultural relativism, but rather point out the interplay between these 
systems.  
A related topic, when thinking about legal pluralism, is the particular 
Indian understanding of secularism, which has been described as one 
of "principled distance."1 It "contrasts sharply" with a US-American or 
European understanding of secularism as the separation of church and 
state and the assumption that religion can be "distilled" from the public 
sphere (Jacobsohn 2003: xii, xiii). Indian secularism has to meet 
the needs of a society with "deep religious diversity" while complying 
with the principle of equality.2 It rests upon a distinction between 






























that every person or group is treated not equally but with equal 
concern and respect. Rather than erecting a "wall of separation", it 
allows the state to intervene in religions in specific situations, both in a 
supporting way (i.e. exempting Sikhs from mandatory helmet laws to 
accommodate the wearing of turbans) and in a restricting manner (i.e. 
forbidding practices that deny equal dignity such as "untouchability" in 
Hinduism).3 This understanding of secularism also allows for the coex-
istence of different religion-based "personal" laws in the area of family 
law. Putting this principled distance into practice surely bears its own 
pitfalls and discontents as the question arises as to whether the state 
keeps the same distance with regard to each religion. 
Drawing on an interdisciplinary approach, the contributions in this 
FOCUS are placed at the interface of law and South Asian studies. 
They examine law in the contexts of society, culture, religion and com-
munity and point to the manifold ways in which law is being practised 
and understood in India. The articles engage with different layers of 
law, such as religion-based laws and laws about religion (Jean-Philippe 
Dequen; Tanja Herklotz), non-state justice systems (Michael Dusche) 
and international law (Chiara Correndo; Rajshree Chandra). The contri-
butions identify various actors and locales where law and legal dis-
courses are shaped, for instance state courts  (Dequen; Herklotz), or 
non-state actors like NGOs, interest groups and civil society (Corren-
do; Chandra; Herklotz) or religious and other communities (Dequen; 
Dusche). The topics range from local to global—from an engagement 
with the ways in which a specific community in the Indian periphery 
settles its disputes by drawing on spirits (Dusche) to the impact of 
international laws and global discourses on women’s rights (Correndo) 
or farmers’ rights (Chandra) in India.   
In the first contribution, "Butas and Daivas as justices in Tulu Nadu: 
implications for the philosophy of law", Michael Dusche examines 
spirit-based justice systems in a community in Tulu Nadu (Karnataka) 
and compares such systems with a modern state-based legal system. 
Dusche shows that spirit-based justice systems are not necessarily tied 
to romantic and orientalised ideas of ancient society. Like law-based 
justice systems, they rely on a particular ethical background con-
sensus. When evaluating the efficaciousness of spirit-based justice-
systems, Dusche argues that we can leave aside the question of whe-
ther these spirits are "real" in the objective sense. Rather, it suffices to 
show that their existence is an intersubjectively shared reality for the 
believers. Drawing on Habermas, Dusche points out that such beliefs, 






























institution whose reality is grounded in the intersubjective "social 
world" rather than in the "objective world" of science or the "subjective 
world" of experience.  
From an engagement with a specific local community, we move to 
religious communities and their legal frameworks. The contributions, 
by Jean-Philippe Dequen and Tanja Herklotz engage with the fact that 
India—like other post-colonial states—maintains a system of religion-
based "personal" laws, according to which certain family matters (such 
as marriage, divorce and maintenance) are governed by the religious 
laws of a community. They are based on religious precepts that were 
partially codified in the colonial era. Their administration remains con-
tentious because some of these laws are seen as patriarchal. Indeed, 
they are a primary example of the tension between conflicting consti-
tutional guarantees, such as the right to equality and religious free-
dom. Both authors discuss the shifts in legal argumentation and claim-
making that have shaped the debate and practice around Muslim Per-
sonal Law and the Uniform Civil Code, respectively.  
In "Reflections on the Shayara Bano petition, a symbol of the Indian 
judiciary’s own evolution on the issue of Triple Talak and the place of 
Muslim Personal Law within the Indian constitutional frame?" Jean-
Philippe Dequen traces the shifts in legal reasoning, argumentation 
and rationale in Indian court debates on the pronouncement of divorce 
in one sitting initiated by the husband (triple talak). Although Muslim 
Personal Law is not codified, Shayara Bano petitioned in early 2016 
before the Indian Supreme Court seeking to declare this practice un-
constitutional and illegal. Her petition raised the question of which 
legal grounds religion-based personal laws should be administered. 
Taking a legal historical perspective, Dequen elucidates factors that 
have shaped legal reasoning concerning Muslim Personal Law and in 
doing so, he reconstructs the shifting legal argumentation leading up 
to the Shayara Bano case. Looking at India’s periphery and examining 
rulings of the High Court in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Dequen obser-
ves a new trend that might shape future discussions. As a Muslim 
majority state, J&K has acquired a symbolic status for India's Muslim 
minority, and consequently, judgments taken at the state level in J&K 
might be regarded as more influential and authoritative by the Muslim 
minority in India than decisions taken at the centre where pressures of 
majoritarianism persist. Recent judgments in J&K hinge upon the 
judges’ interpretation of religious texts rather than external sources. In 






























and creative approaches to controversial issues are found at the state 
level where the cases are negotiated in context.  
In her article entitled "Dead letters? The Uniform Civil Code through 
the eyes of the Indian women’s movement and the Indian Supreme 
Court", Tanja Herklotz engages with the proposal for a Uniform Civil 
Code (UCC) for India to replace the existing religious personal law sys-
tem. She assesses the topic by analysing the discourses around the 
UCC within the Indian women’s movement and the Indian Supreme 
Court—two actors that are believed to be avant-garde and striving to 
achieve an expansion of rights for vulnerable groups. She points out 
that while the rhetoric and argumentation of the two entities is astoni-
shingly different, both entities have in actual fact accepted legal plu-
ralism with regard to religion based personal laws. While the women’s 
movement has turned away from its initial call for a UCC and now 
openly questions the feasibility of such a project, the Supreme Court 
pays lip service to the constitution in its rhetorical call for the Code 
while demonstrating no real action to push the project further. How-
ever, this does not mean that article 44 is a "dead letter." Its essen-
ce−uniformity and equality−is gradually being carried out through 
other means: not through an all-encompassing legislative top-down 
reform, but through a gradual step-by-step approach at the level of 
high court decisions and through tentative legislative reforms. 
Women’s rights are not only relevant when dealing with religion. Ra-
ther, they have many other facets that are worthy of discussing. The 
contribution by Chiara Correndo entitled "Of women and myths: revi-
sing analytical approaches to gender issues in India", engages with 
discourses on gendered violence in India, in particular dowry-related 
crimes. Correndo’s main point of critique is the common European 
recourse to "cultural explanations" for gender-related crimes in India 
which causes a misrepresentation of such practices as pathological to a 
"static" Indian culture and tradition. Such explanations do not investi-
gate the causes of violence. Instead, this exoticisation places dis-
courses on gender-based violence within narrow confines that do not 
allow for development and change. Correndo advocates a grounded, 
thoroughly researched perspective on the operationalisation of the 
laws and realities in which women live. This encompasses taking into 
account various normative spheres, as well as social fabrics, economic 
shifts and historical trajectories. For instance, the persistence of 
dowry-giving is not only a matter of "traditional" practices but might 
also be a "fast track" to wealth and status, two aspects that are related 






























gender-relations. Correndo advocates a re-examination of the interplay 
tradition and culture to understand the plurality of issues that women 
in India face on various societal levels. 
The last contribution in the FOCUS links the debates on law in India 
to global discourses and points to the tensions and ambivalences be-
tween global legal regimes and their context-specific implementation 
and negotiation. In "Farmers’ rights in India: 'globally sui generis'" 
Rajshree Chandra shows how the activities of international biotechno-
logy organisations impose notions of intellectual property, bio cultures 
and innovation on Indian farmers that differ significantly from the exis-
ting Indian conceptions. This necessitates farmers, NGOs and the Indi-
an government to frame demands, claims and protection measures in 
a fashion that fits with global discourses but that often clashes with 
traditional knowledge and conceptions of land, property and agricul-
ture. Similar to Dusche, Chandra touches upon a central aspect for the 
effective functioning, acceptance and legitimacy of a legal system: par-
ticipation necessitates understanding the system and the normative 
order upon which the system is based. In this context, the farmers’ 
capability to access and inhabit the content of claims to seeds is a pre-
condition for activism and successful petitions.  
Other than providing a brief glance through the kaleidoscope at the 
law in India, with this FOCUS we would also like to foster interdiscipli-
nary work at the intersection of law and area studies. So far, European 
legal scholarship still seems to be shaped by a certain fixation on the 
global North. As Werner Menski remarks: "Eurocentric academic per-
spectives have been misleading us and continue to misdirect us into 
forms of partial theorising that lose global validity the moment we 
cross the Bosporus or Gibraltar" (2016: 128). In legal academic work 
the global South has only recently begun to feature more prominently. 
On the other hand, in area studies law has been historicised or non-
state systems have been looked at in the local context, and the inter-
play between state law and non-state law has largely been neglected. 
The spheres of state and society often seem to exist in parallel. With 
this FOCUS we want to make a contribution to filling this gap between 
the different disciplines and provide for a fruitful dialogue between 
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